Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam Audiobook, by John A. Nagl Play Audiobook Sample

Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam Audiobook

Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam Audiobook, by John A. Nagl Play Audiobook Sample
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Read By: John Pruden Publisher: Blackstone Publishing Listen Time: at 1.0x Speed 5.83 hours at 1.5x Speed 4.38 hours at 2.0x Speed Release Date: May 2012 Format: Unabridged Audiobook ISBN: 9781481590884

Quick Stats About this Audiobook

Total Audiobook Chapters:

14

Longest Chapter Length:

64:40 minutes

Shortest Chapter Length:

03:49 minutes

Average Chapter Length:

37:37 minutes

Audiobooks by this Author:

2

Other Audiobooks Written by John A. Nagl: > View All...

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Publisher Description

Invariably, armies are accused of preparing to fight the previous war. In Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl—a veteran of both Operation Desert Storm and the conflict in Iraq—considers the now crucial question of how armies adapt to changing circumstances during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared. Through the use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both engagements, Nagl compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960 with what developed in the Vietnam War from 1950 to 1975.

In examining these two events, Nagl argues that organizational culture is key to the ability to learn from unanticipated conditions, a variable which explains why the British army successfully conducted counterinsurgency in Malaya and why the American army failed to do so in Vietnam, treating the war instead as a conventional conflict. Nagl concludes that the British army, because of its role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics created by its history and national culture, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency.

With a new preface reflecting on the author’s combat experience in Iraq, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife is a timely examination of the lessons of previous counterinsurgency campaigns that will be hailed by both military leaders and interested civilians.

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"This was a really useful book for me because it helped me to increase my knowledge about Vietnam (which was pretty small beforehand) and provide some extremely useful and insightful ideas about the counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although the ideas that Nagl brings up in the book about the proper way to fight an insurgency (mostly taken from the lessons the British learned in Malaya) can't necessarily be called a roadmap for peace I'm hard pressed to think that a lot of them wouldn't work very well in America's current wars. President for a day huh. If you're interested in either Vietnam or ways out of Iraq and Afghanistan I would definitely recommend this book."

— Andrew (4 out of 5 stars)

Quotes

  • “[A] highly regarded counterinsurgency manual.”

    — Washington Post
  • “Colonel Nagl’s book is one of a half dozen Vietnam histories—most of them highly critical of the US military in Vietnam—that are changing the military’s views on how to fight guerrilla wars…The tome has already had an influence on the ground in Iraq.”

    — Wall Street Journal
  • “The success of DPhil papers by Oxford students is usually gauged by the amount of dust they gather on library shelves. But there is one that is so influential that General George Casey, the US commander in Iraq, is said to carry it with him everywhere. Most of his staff have been ordered to read it, and he pressed a copy into the hands of Donald Rumsfeld when he visited Baghdad in December. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (a title taken from T. E. Lawrence—himself no slouch in guerrilla warfare) is a study of how the British Army succeeded in snuffing out the Malayan insurgency between 1948 and 1960—and why the Americans failed in Vietnam…It is helping to transform the American military in the face of its greatest test since Vietnam.”

    — Times (London)
  • “It’s past time to make Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife required reading at the White House.”

    — Philadelphia Inquirer
  • “The capacity to adapt is always a key contributor to military success. Nagl combines historical analysis with a comprehensive examination of organizational theory to rationalize why, as many of his readers will already intuitively sense, ‘military organizations often demonstrate remarkable resistance to doctrinal change’ and fail to be as adaptive as required. His analysis is helpful in determining why the US Army can appear so innovative in certain respects and yet paradoxically slow to adapt in others.”

    — Military Review
  • “Of the different books produced on this subject, Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl’s Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife is an absolute must for those who want to gain valuable insight on some of the hard lessons of fighting an insurgency before actually getting on the ground. The book expertly combines theoretical foundations of insurgencies with detailed historical lessons of Malaya and Vietnam to produce some very profound and topical implications for current military operations. The true success of the book is that Nagl discusses all of these complex issues in an easy-to-follow and straightforward manner…I read this book upon returning from my tour in Iraq after commanding a company on the ground for a year. I was amazed at how insightful and ‘true’ the conclusions were and wished that I had read it before I deployed.”

    — Armor
  • “Stimulating, thoughtful, and serious.”

    — Jerusalem Post
  • “An extremely relevant text. Those interested in understanding the difficulties faced by Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, or who want to grasp the intricacies of the most likely form of conflict for the near future, will gain applicable lessons. [Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife] offers insights about how to mold America’s armed forces into modern learning organizations. As the Pentagon ponders its future in the Quadrennial Defense Review, one can only hope that Nagl’s invaluable lesson in learning and adapting is being exploited.”

    — Frank G. Hoffman, Proceedings of the United State Naval Institute

Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife Listener Reviews

Overall Performance: 3.90909090909091 out of 53.90909090909091 out of 53.90909090909091 out of 53.90909090909091 out of 53.90909090909091 out of 5 (3.91)
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  • Overall Performance: 5 out of 55 out of 55 out of 55 out of 55 out of 5

    " Nagl compares the British and American approaches to counterinsurgency (in Malaya and Vietnam) through the lens of organizational design. An excellent book for thinking about how information flows in organizations with a number of great historic examples of how organizations 'choose' to learn or to not learn from the world around them. "

    — Gavin, 1/22/2014
  • Overall Performance: 5 out of 55 out of 55 out of 55 out of 55 out of 5

    " .... kind of into the immediatly relevant stuff now, but great history about the difference between a freedom fighter and an insurgent without all the media confusion "

    — Dustin, 1/9/2014
  • Overall Performance: 4 out of 54 out of 54 out of 54 out of 54 out of 5

    " Excellent. It was beyond thoroughly researched... Simply amazing. I would be interested in seeing Nagl take a deeper look at the Malaysian conflict. Not much to say beyond this. "

    — Jared, 12/14/2013
  • Overall Performance: 3 out of 53 out of 53 out of 53 out of 53 out of 5

    " kind of dry. read it more for business strategy than military strategy. there's not a lot of new stuff in that regard, but it's interesting from an historical perspective. "

    — xtian, 12/11/2013
  • Overall Performance: 5 out of 55 out of 55 out of 55 out of 55 out of 5

    " The paperback edition adds a very interesting introduction in which Col. Nagl discusses his recent experiences in Iraq in light of the lessons in this book. "

    — carl, 12/9/2013
  • Overall Performance: 3 out of 53 out of 53 out of 53 out of 53 out of 5

    " I learned a new way to fight the low intensity conflict with asymmetric weapon and unconventional tactic in a new kind of warfare. Gotta go to find another reference book. "

    — Tintin, 12/8/2013
  • Overall Performance: 3 out of 53 out of 53 out of 53 out of 53 out of 5

    " Really good, just like the new COIN field manual, and probably ultimately just as dangerously misleading. "

    — BAKU, 9/5/2013
  • Overall Performance: 3 out of 53 out of 53 out of 53 out of 53 out of 5

    " Ok, not much detail on how to fight an insurgency. "

    — Scott, 5/25/2013
  • Overall Performance: 4 out of 54 out of 54 out of 54 out of 54 out of 5

    " A little dry, being based on heavily researched and quoted material. But the essence is that counterinsurgency requires agile tactical and political skills, which the British model embraces and the US military command was incapable of. "

    — Michael, 4/4/2013
  • Overall Performance: 5 out of 55 out of 55 out of 55 out of 55 out of 5

    " The book compares the counter insurgency strategies of British in the Malayan Emergency and the Americans in Vietnam. Really confirmed my views on why the US Army is a backward institution despite its technological superiority. "

    — Carlo, 10/15/2012
  • Overall Performance: 3 out of 53 out of 53 out of 53 out of 53 out of 5

    " Tightly composed, assertive and incisve study of military organisational learning. Could probably benefit from recognition of basic diffences in the xontext of the Malayan and Indochina conflicts. Just as we can't transfer the Vietnam learning to the Sfghanistan conflict "

    — Jan, 10/10/2012

About John A. Nagl

Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl, US Army (ret.), is a military assistant to the deputy secretary of defense. He led a tank platoon in the First Cavalry Division in Operation Desert Storm, taught national security studies at West Point’s Department of Social Sciences, and served as the operations officer of Task Force 1-34 Armor with the First Infantry Division in Khalidiyah, Iraq.

About John Pruden

John Pruden is an Earphones Award–winning audiobook narrator. His exposure to many people, places, and experiences throughout his life provides a deep creative well from which he draws his narrative and vocal characterizations. His narration of The Killing of Crazy Horse by Thomas Powers was chosen by the Washington Post as a Best Audiobook of 2010.